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We examine a symmetric two-district setting with spillovers of local public 
spending where a spill-in from the foreign spending is not a substitute, but a 
complement to domestic spending. Specifically, we assume production of two 
district-specific public goods out of two complementary district-specific inputs. We 
compare equilibria in non-cooperative decentralization and cooperative 
centralization for different spillovers, complementarities and cost-division rules, 
and control for the effects of strategic delegation and the feasibility of voluntary 
contributions to the input in the foreign district. We find that centralization 
welfare-dominates decentralization in most institutional settings and for a wide 
range of parameters, yet we can also identify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
decentralization to welfare-dominate centralization. The setup features three 
novelties: In the absence of transfers, welfare in decentralization increases in 
spillovers, strategic delegation in decentralization improves welfare, and centralized 
provision may be non-monotonic in spillovers.  
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The existence of multiple governments, mobility of factors and consumers, and a large insti-
tutional variety makes ﬁscal federalism one of the richest subﬁelds in public economics. In
spite of proliferation of studies on the vast array of tax and revenue instruments, a fundamen-
tal design issue in ﬁscal federalism still remains whether to centralize or decentralize public
expenditures. By the seminal Oates’ decentralization theorem (Oates 1972), this particular
tradeoﬀ is relatively straightforward when it comes to spillovers: the beneﬁts of centraliza-
tion relative to decentralization increase in the level of spillovers and decrease in the taste
diﬀerences.
In this paper, we reexamine the role of spillovers in the presence of taste homogeneity.
A standard approach is to deﬁne the spillover from foreign public spending to be a pure
substitute of the domestic public spending. In contrast, we analyze a complete class of com-
plementary aggregations. Although complementary (weak-link and weakest-link) composition
functions have been extensively studied for a single pure public good (Hirshleifer 1983; Vi-
cary 1990; Vicary and Sandler 2002; Ray et al 2007; Cornes and Hartley 2007; Gregor 2011),
complementarities, to our best knowledge, have not yet been embedded in a setup with cross-
border spillovers. The major diﬀerence is the introduction of multiple composite public goods
aggregated out of domestic and foreign spending by district-speciﬁc complementary aggrega-
tions.
We build a setup with two districts and two geographically-speciﬁc inputs, one per district,
where each local input generates a positive spillover in the other district.1 A level of an output
produced in a district and consumed entirely in the district is determined by complementary
aggregation of the domestic input and spill-in from the foreign input. We compare two
regimes, a non-cooperative decentralized regime, and a cooperative centralized regime that
assumes that delegates from the districts maximize joint surplus. For decentralization, we
introduce the possibility of voluntary transfers, so that the government in a district i is
permitted to contribute to the provision of both domestic input i and foreign input −i.
Another key option is whether a district may strategically delegate an agent with a dif-
ferent valuation of the public good. Strategic delegation is a natural phenomenon in models
where delegates (politicians) bargain and their principals (representative voters) behave non-
cooperatively; low-value delegation is typically used to strategically decrease the breakdown
allocation, and induce relatively larger compensations (Segendorﬀ 1998). Strategic delega-
tion is one of the many extensions that the second-generation of ﬁscal federalism (Oates 2005;
Lockwood 2006) introduces to investigate robustness of the decentralization theorem in re-
alistic political economy settings; other possible extensions involve electoral accountability,
1Given that composite public goods are non-linear in the expenditures, the two-district assumption is a
necessary ﬁrst step to avoid complexities of multidistrict (or higher-order) spillovers (Bloch and Zenginobuz
2007).
1lobbying (Cheikbossian 2008), bias of the median from the mean (Lockwood 2008), or endoge-
nous centralization (Ruta 2010). Here, strategic delegation is the key strategic instrument
that aﬀects both decentralization and centralization, each through a diﬀerent channel.
With complementarity, transfers and strategic delegation, we observe that taste homogene-
ity is no longer a suﬃcient condition for welfare dominance of centralization. This ﬁnding
contributes to the literature on the lack of robustness of centralization to strategic delegation
(Besley and Coate 2003; Dur and Roelfsema 2005). In the absence of transfers, we even
observe that the welfare in decentralization paradoxically increase in the level of spillovers.
In addition, the provision in centralization is generally non-monotonic in the spillovers. As
a result, the relative welfare gain of centralization may decrease in the level of spillovers. To
our best knowledge, the only paper that achieved the identical result for the relative beneﬁts
is Kothenbuerger (2008).
Speciﬁcally, our welfare assessment compares distortions associated with complete spe-
cialization in decentralization and distortions associated with strategic delegation in central-
ization. Centralization generally tends to welfare-dominate decentralization. Under some
parameters, it is even welfare-superior irrespective of the levels of spillovers, exactly as in
Oates (1972). Only if voluntary transfers are feasible, decentralization turns out to be unam-
biguously more attractive for low spillovers, as in Besley and Coate (2003). Our explanation
is nevertheless alternative to the one considered for substitutes. In decentralization of comple-
mentary spillovers with transfers, the equilibrium features cross-district specialization upon
the foreign inputs. An increase in spillovers makes spill-ins from the foreign inputs more
abundant, and the low elasticity between the foreign spill-in and domestic input (a property
of complementary aggregations) causes that the foreign input becomes less demanded in the
production mix. Cross-specialization upon the foreign inputs thus becomes more distortive
and welfare deteriorates. In the classic case of substitutes, the districts specialize on the do-
mestic inputs. An increase in spill-ins makes foreign inputs relatively more productive, hence
specialization upon domestic inputs is more distortive, and the districts become worse oﬀ.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds the setup of the district-speciﬁc com-
plementary production functions and solves for the social optimum. Section 3 shows how
infeasibility of transfers to the foreign input generates a welfare loss in decentralization, plus
a paradoxical eﬀect that larger spillovers improve provision. Section 4 studies how introduc-
ing voluntary transfers leads to specialization across districts and improves welfare both with
and without strategic delegation. Section 5 studies centralization, mainly in the presence
of strategic delegation. It compares centralization and decentralization under various cost-
division rules, and explores the decentralization tradeoﬀ in the levels of spillovers. The ﬁnal
Section 6 concludes the paper.
22 Setup
2.1 Assumptions
We have districts 1,2 and inputs x,y with common price p > 0. Input x ∈ R+ is geographically
speciﬁc for District 1 and input y ∈ R+ for District 2. An input represents, e.g., the number
of cultural facilities or the size of police squad in each district. Out of each unit of any input,
an exogenous parameter κ ∈ (0, 1
2) represents the spillover into the foreign district and 1 − κ
the domestic use of the input.2 The eﬀective amounts of inputs in District i, (Xi,Yi), are
(X1,Y1) = ((1−κ)x,κy) and (X2,Y2) = (κx,(1−κ)y). The eﬀective domestic input aggregates
with the eﬀective foreign input (i.e., foreign spill-in) by a complementary technology with a
constant elasticity of substitution 1
1+ρ. The complementarity reﬂects properties of tastes
or technologies, namely a strong preference for variety, or protection against an adversary







The parameter ρ ≥ −1 determines the shape of the aggregation: For ρ = −1, we have a
classic case of perfect substitution (also coined ‘strategic substitution’, cf. Dur and Roelfsema,
2005) and for ρ ∈ (−1,0) imperfect substitution. Our interest is in ρ > 0, which reﬂects
complementarity, converging with ρ → +∞ to perfect complementarity, i.e., g1 = min{(1 −
κ)x,κy}. We keep the parameter ρ instead of elasticity of substitution, bearing in mind that
the elasticity is a strictly decreasing transformation of ρ.
The payments for inputs by District i are (pxi,pyi), hence total amounts of inputs are
(x,y) = (x1 + x2,y1 + y2). If voluntary transfers are feasible, then x2 ∈ R+ and y1 ∈ R+; if
not, then the restriction x2 = y1 = 0 applies. We assume that District i is represented by a
single Citizen i with a quasi-linear utility, where input costs (or, beneﬁts from private good
consumption) are linear while beneﬁts from the district-speciﬁc public output is logarithmic
with taste parameter λ > 0,
ui = λlngi − p(xi + yi).
Thereby, we keep both production and valuation symmetric, disregard any within-district
diﬀerences, and abstract from the income eﬀects which allows us to separate the public goods
allocation decision from distributional decisions (Bergstrom and Cornes 1983).
With strategic delegation, the game separates into two stages. In Stage 1, Citizens 1 and 2
simultaneously and non-cooperatively select arbitrary identities of their delegates, λ1 ≥ 0 and
2This division of the unit suggests rivalry in the use of each input, but equally we can presume non-
rivalry, i.e., domestic use of full unit and foreign use of κ < 1 units. The advantage of our approach is that
social optimum is invariant to κ, which largely simpliﬁes exposition of the main results. The extreme cases of
κ ∈ {0,
1
2} are discussed always in limits since some variables take improper values if evaluated in the extremes.
3λ2 ≥ 0. In Stage 2, Delegates 1 and 2 provide the inputs (cooperatively or non-cooperatively).
Costs are born by the corresponding citizen.3 By strategic delegation, each citizen thus
non-cooperatively manipulates allocation in the subgame played between the delegates. If
λ1 = λ2 = λ holds in an equilibrium with strategic delegation, we call the regime (under given
exogenous parameters) delegation-proof. Without delegation, the game reduces to a single
stage where citizens (cooperatively in centralization or non-cooperatively in decentralization)
decide on payments for the inputs themselves.
Let φ := (1−κ
κ )ρ be a measure of asymmetry of input productivity that combines both the
eﬀect of spillover and shape of the aggregation. To see how it captures asymmetry, rewrite
the public output, without loss of generality in District 1, as
g1 = (1 − κ)(x−ρ + φy−ρ)−1/ρ.
In a symmetric proﬁle, a foreign input is clearly φ-times more productive than a domestic
input. The level ρ = 0 separates two structurally diﬀerent cases, substitutability and com-
plementarity. For substitutability (ρ < 0), we get φ ∈ (0,1); each citizen thus cares relatively
more for the domestic input. For complementarity (ρ > 0) which is the topic of our interest,
there is φ ∈ (1,+∞), and each citizen cares relatively more for the foreign input. A detailed
analysis of the special importance of the foreign inputs in the complementary production
functions with spillovers is relegated into the Appendix.
2.2 Social optimum
To derive the social optimum, we investigate symmetric proﬁles, x = y. Maximization of




   
























































dx = 1 that stems from symmetry and plugging (1) into the ﬁrst-order condition,
socially optimal inputs yield




3Besley and Coate (2003) oﬀer political-economy microfoundations for motivation of the delegates through
citizen-candidate assumptions whereby (i) a median citizen’s preference represents average preferences in a
heterogeneous district, (ii) district citizens by simple-majority elect identity of their delegate, (iii) only district
citizens are eligible for delegation, and (iv) all district citizens pay identical tax. Then, the elected delegate is
the median citizen’s preferred delegate. To save for notation, we directly assume that a single citizen nominates
a delegate with a preferred taste for the public good.
43 Decentralization, no transfers
3.1 No delegation
We start with the assumption that transfers to the other district are not feasible, hence each










The ﬁrst result in this baseline speciﬁcation is achieved simply by inserting marginal
products from (1) into the ﬁrst-order condition in (2).
Result 1 (Decentralization without transfers, no delegation) The equilibrium amounts
of inputs in decentralization without transfers and without delegation (baseline case) are











Underprovision is a standard result, but comparative statics of the baseline equilibrium is
not obvious. With an increase in the input asymmetry φ, the provision drops from 1
2 to 0, and
underprovision is increasingly more serious. Recall however that the increase in asymmetry is
associated with an increase in complementarity or a decrease in spillover. Thus, by increasing
spillovers, inputs become more symmetric, hence provision improves. Contrary to established
ﬁndings, we observe in a baseline setting that an increase in spillovers improves provision
of all local public goods. To restore an opposite prediction of the decentralization theorem,
we will see that the citizens and delegates must not be constrained to specialize on the less
productive inputs which are for complementary spillovers the domestic inputs.
3.2 Strategic delegation
Introduction of strategic delegation separates the game into two stages. In Stage 1, Citizens
1 and 2 simultaneously and non-cooperatively select their Delegates, characterized by tastes
λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. In Stage 2 under decentralization, Delegates 1 and 2 simultaneously and
non-cooperatively provide the inputs. By strategic delegation, each citizen non-cooperatively
manipulates allocation in the subgame played between the delegates. The equilibrium in the
non-cooperative subgame of delegates is located on the other delegate’s best response, hence
choosing an optimal delegate is equivalent to the optimization along the other delegate’s best
response. This is because the other delegate’s best response is unchanged with manipulations
of the taste of own delegate. Best responses of Delegates 1 and 2, denoted as xC
1 (y) and
yC
2 (x), are constructed from the standard ﬁrst-order conditions upon each delegate’s utility
























By expressing the marginal products in the general form (not only for symmetric alloca-



























Now, to identify an equilibrium pair (λ1,λ2) = (λ′,λ′) and corresponding equilibrium
inputs (x′,y′), we check possible deviations of Citizen 2 in Stage 1 from an allocation (x′,y′) =
(xC
1 (y′),y′) that is induced by delegates in the subsequent Stage 2. For an equilibrium, a






















The important diﬀerence to the case without delegation is the presence of strategic com-
plementarity, dxC
1 (y)/dy > 0, which gives an incentive to exploit the option of high-value
strategic delegation. Intuitively, if citizens nominated delegates sincerely (λ1 = λ2 = λ), then
delegates would implement xb = yb as characterized by (2), but entering (2) into (5) reveals
an opportunity for unilateral improvement, given that
du2
dy
   











Using an implicit-function theorem upon the implicit-form best response of Delegate 1 in






1 + ρφ + φ
. (6)
Now, we exploit that a pair of symmetric delegates (λ′,λ′) plays a symmetric allocation
and that the equilibrium in the subgame of Stage 2 is already characterized by Result 1, only
with diﬀerent tastes, x′ = 1
1+φ
λ′
p . The symmetry allows us to insert complementarity in (6)




(1 + φ)(1 + ρφ)
1 + ρφ + φ
> 1.
Next, we use x′
xb = λ′




x∗, to obtain the next result.
6Result 2 (Decentralization without transfers, delegation) The equilibrium amounts of



















Like in the case without delegation, by increasing spillovers, inputs become more symmet-
ric, hence provision improves: dx′
dκ > 0. Again, this non-intuitive property is a consequence of
an inferior matching of inputs to districts, and the impossibility to cross-subsidize the foreign
input.
4 Decentralization with voluntary transfers
Since the foreign inputs are more productive in symmetric allocation, φ > 1, the introduction
of voluntary transfers to the foreign input should motivate citizens to boost provision by
relocating contributions from domestic to foreign inputs. To start with, we derive for each
player4 an optimal amount of each input, conditional on having the amount of the other
input ﬁxed and assuming that the player covers the full cost of the input. We call it a single-
input optimum and denote as xC
i (y) and yC
i (x). This is consistent with our previous notation
where xC
1 (y) and yC
2 (x) in the case without transfers have been deﬁned as the citizens’ best
responses; these best responses are by deﬁnition their single-input optima for the domestic
inputs.
We will show that a unique decentralized equilibrium with transfers features complete
specialization on the foreign input, where (x1,y1) = (0,yC
1 (x)) and (x2,y2) = (xC
2 (y),0).
That cross-specialization emerges in an equilibrium is not surprising in itself since the foreign
input is, in any symmetric allocation, φ-times more productive than the domestic input.
Given the mutual use of transfers across districts, we call each cross-specialization proﬁle a
T-proﬁle (transfer proﬁle), and then characterize explicitly the equilibrium T-proﬁle.
The single-input optima xC
i (y), and yC
























If the inputs are provided by citizens (i.e., in the absence of delegation), we use single-input
optima with λi = λ. We plot these optima for imperfect complements in Fig. 1(a) and for
perfect complements in Fig. 1(b). The implicit-form characterizations satisfy the following:
4The single-input optima are characterized for players who determine the provision, i.e. for citizens in












































(a) 0 < ρ < +∞ (b) ρ = +∞
Figure 1: Citizens’ single-input optima, baseline equilibrium (B) and transfer equilibrium (T)

















































In the subgame of providers (citizens in the absence of delegation, delegates in the presence
of strategic delegation), we apply the following necessary equilibrium conditions: For each
input, (i) a provider of a positive amount of input must be in his or her single-input optimum,
and (ii) a non-provider’s single-input optimum must be lower or equal than the equilibrium
amount of the input. Both are obvious: violation of (i) motivates the provider to unilaterally
deviate by increasing or decreasing the amount, and violation of (ii) makes the non-provider





2 (x)}. In order to identify the maxima in symmetry, let us start with
x-input and denote LHS and RHS from implicit characterizations of xC
1 (y) and xC
2 (y) in (7)


























Solving ﬁrst the regime without delegation, λ1 = λ2 = λ, we have L1(x,y) > L2(x,y),
R1(x,y) = R2(x,y), ∂Li
∂x > 0 and ∂Ri
∂x = 0 for i = 1,2, thus we obtain xC
2 (y) > xC
1 (y).
Using superscript ‘t’ for T-proﬁle, hence xt = max{xC
1 (yt),xC
2 (yt)} = xC
2 (yt). By analogy, we
obtain yt = max{yC
1 (xt),yC
2 (xt)} = yC
1 (xt). Both is easily seen on Fig. 1(a). By imposing
symmetry into the implicitly derived single-input optima in (7) and (8), we derive the unique
decentralized equilibrium with transfers and without delegation.
Result 3 (Decentralization with transfers, no delegation) The equilibrium amounts of







Clearly, abolishing the restriction to pay only for the domestic input increases provision,
and also welfare, as xb < 1
2 < xt < x∗. With increasing asymmetry φ (due to increasing
complementarity or decreasing spillover), the equilibrium converges to the social optimum,
as the provision grows from 1
2 to 1. Therefore, under transfers that exploit comparative
advantages of cross-specialization, we happen to restore the standard observation that a
larger spillover (i.e., lower asymmetry) worsens the decentralized provision. With increasing
spillovers, Citizen 1 specializes on a decreasingly important (foreign) input, which magniﬁes
distortion of decentralization.
We may shed even more light on the distortion associated with underprovision in this
equilibrium. Both single-input optima are increasing in the other input. This implies strate-
gic complementarity on both sides, and it is socially optimal to commit both districts to an
allocation that exploits this strategic complementarity. Given that non-cooperative equilib-
rium does not account for strategic complementarity, there must be a wedge between the
social optimum and the decentralized equilibrium. Only in the case of perfect complements
where single-input optima are constant, as in Fig. 1(b), this opportunity for improvement is
not present, and decentralized optimum is socially eﬃcient.
To understand the extreme case of perfect complementarity more in detail, see that for
Citizen 1 with output g1 = min{(1 − κ)x,κy}, marginal products are discontinuous. The
marginal product of x-input is positive, ∂g1/∂x = 1 − κ, if (1 − κ)x < κy (the complemen-
tarity constraint does not bind) and zero otherwise (the complementarity constraint binds).
Similarly, ∂g1/∂y = κ if (1−κ)x > κy and zero otherwise. Single-input optima feature social
optimum, xC
1 (y) = yC







1−κy y < 1−κ
κ x∗









κ x x < κ
1−κy∗
y∗ x ≥ κ
1−κy∗
.
Now, the outcome for perfect complementarity dramatically diﬀers depending on the fea-
sibility of transfers. In the baseline case, for positive x > 0 and y > 0, we have xC
1 (y) < y and
yC
2 (x) < x. Thus, there is no equilibrium for positive (x,y), and we observe xC
1 (y) = yC
2 (x)
if and only if xb = yb = 0. In the transfer regime, we ﬁnd that xC
2 (y) ≥ xC
1 (y) and
yC
1 (x) ≥ yC
2 (x) (as in the case of imperfect complements), hence the symmetric equilib-
rium satisﬁes xt = max{xC
1 (yt),xC
2 (yt)} = xC
2 (yt) and yt = max{yC
1 (xt),yC
2 (xt)} = yC
1 (xt)
and this is equilibrium if xt = yt = x∗.
4.2 Strategic delegation
By strategic delegation, each citizen can non-cooperatively manipulate allocation in the sub-
game played between the delegates. In the case without transfers, the only eﬀect of strategic
delegation was to exploit the strategic complementarity. The reason was that the structure
of the equilibrium proﬁle was always the same for any combination of tastes of the delegates;
namely, in a subgame of delegate, each delegate specialized on the domestic input. With
transfers and strategic delegation, cross-specialization is not generally warranted.
To start with, we easily observe that single-input optima of a delegate are increasing in the
















We analyze the problem from the perspective of Citizen 1. We know that xC
1 (y) < xC
2 (y)
if λ1 = λ2, and that xC
1 (y) is increasing in taste λ1. Thus, for each y, there is a critical level
λ1 > λ2 where xC
1 (y) ≤ xC
2 (y) if λ1 ≤ λ1 and xC
1 (y) ≥ xC
2 (y) if λ1 ≥ λ1. Similarly, yC
1 (x)
is increasing in taste λ1 and recall yC
1 (x) > yC
2 (x) if λ1 = λ2. Thus, for each x, there is a
critical level λ1 < λ2 where yC
1 (x) ≤ yC
2 (x) if λ1 ≤ λ1 and yC
1 (x) ≥ yC
2 (x) if λ1 ≥ λ1. In total,
the equilibrium of the provision subgame varies in the three intervals: (i) λ1 ≤ λ1, where
(x,y) = (xC
2 (y),yC
2 (x)) and Delegate 1 free rides on Delegate 2 (to be called F-proﬁle); (ii)
λ1 < λ1 < λ1, where (x,y) = (xC
2 (y),yC
1 (x)), hence delegates cross-specialize (T-proﬁle); and
(iii) λ1 ≥ λ1, where (x,y) = (xC
1 (y),yC
1 (x)) and Delegate 1 pays full cost alone (to be called
all-pay, A-proﬁle).5 We proceed by analyzing only the subset of T-equilibria and then we
check robustness of the resulting T-equilibrium to deviations to F-proﬁles and A-proﬁles.
To examine the set of T-proﬁles that occur in the subgame of delegates, we start with
sincere delegation, λ1 = λ2 = λ. In this case, each delegate specializes on the foreign input
in the equilibrium. Examine incentives of Citizen 1 to deviate from sincere delegation when
5In the border case λ1 = λ1, there are equilibrium proﬁles where both district contribute positive amounts
to y-input. Similarly, if λ1 = λ1, there are multiple equilibria where both district contribute to x-input.
10Citizen 2 delegates sincerely, λ2 = λ. A marginal change in Delegate 1’s taste does not
violate that xC
2 (y) > xC
1 (y) and yC
1 (x) > yC
2 (x), hence the structure of the cross-specialization
equilibrium is preserved, (x,y) = (xC
2 (y),yC
1 (x)). The manipulation of the identity of Delegate
1 amounts to moving along the best response of Delegate 2, which is by the structure of T-
proﬁle characterized by (x,y) = (xC






















By strategic delegation, Citizen 1 now internalizes complementarity between the inputs,
dxC
2 (y)/dy > 0, hence obtains an extra positive marginal beneﬁt. This extra beneﬁt motivates
high-value strategic delegation. We apply the implicit function theorem upon the single-
input demand of Delegate 2 (which is the best response along which Citizen 1 is optimizing),




















1 + ρ + φ
∈ (0,1) (9)
The exact size of the complementarity will be later useful for the comparison with the
strategic delegation in centralization. Notice that the positive eﬀect of strategic complemen-
tarity is diminishing to zero for increasing asymmetry between inputs (increasing φ),6 as
we approach orthogonal best responses. The orthogonal single-input optima under perfect
complementarity are visible in Fig. 1(b).
Conditional on subgames with specialization T-proﬁles, we can characterize the symmetric
equilibrium in the strategic delegation game, denoted as (˜ λ, ˜ λ). We use marginal products in





















1 + ρ + φ
 
= 0.





φ(1 + ρ + φ)
> 1.
Does the equilibrium T-proﬁle still underprovide relative to the social optimum? We use




p. The inputs provided
by ˜ λ-delegates indeed show underprovision, albeit vanishing with perfect complementarity or
zero spillovers.
6Combining L’Hˆ opital’s rule,
∂φ















11Result 4 (Decentralization with transfers and delegation) Restricting to T-proﬁles in
the provision subgames, the equilibrium amounts of inputs in decentralization with transfers
















Like in the regimes without delegation, abolishing the restriction to pay only for the
domestic input increases provision and welfare, x′ < ˜ x < 1. And again, we return from
a paradoxical comparative statics of the baseline case to the standard case, namely that an
increase in the spillovers worsens decentralized provision, ∂˜ x
∂κ < 0. The explanation rests again
in the relative productivity of the domestic and foreign input. With an increase in spillovers,
the domestic and foreign inputs converge in the productivity; in cross-specialization, the
relative productivity of the paid input drops, hence the equilibrium is more distorted from
the social optimum.
T-proﬁle induced by delegation (˜ λ, ˜ λ) in Stage 1 is stable to deviations to all other T-
proﬁles, but it must be stable also to deviations to F-proﬁles and A-proﬁles. Lemma 1
proves that deviation from the T-proﬁle to any A-proﬁle cannot improve utility. As a result,
when considering incentives for strategic delegation, we will only have to compare the case of
strategically low delegation inducing free riding (F-proﬁle) with the case of strategic delegation
inducing the best proﬁle among the cross-specialization proﬁles (T-proﬁle). We discuss in
the Appendix the parametric cases when a F-proﬁle is suﬃciently attractive to motivate
deviation from the T-proﬁle. To conclude, under some parameters, strategic delegation not
only brings an opportunity to exploit strategic complementarities of cross-specialization, but
also a potential instability vis-a-vis strategic free riding.
Lemma 1 In T-proﬁle with (λ1,λ2) = (˜ λ, ˜ λ), a unilateral deviation to any (all-pay) A-proﬁle
is not in any citizen’s best response.
5 Cooperative centralization
We introduce cooperative centralization as in Besley and Coate (2003). They presume that
the delegates can maximize joint surplus W = u1 + u2, and accordingly divide the costs
by a pre-determined rule. For utility linear in private consumption, maximization of joint
surplus is independent on the division of cost. Therefore, if delegates are symmetric, λ1 = λ2,
the surplus-maximizing amounts of inputs for the delegates are derived analogically to the
derivation of social optimum for the citizens, namely x = y = λ1
p = λ2
p . In the absence of
strategic delegation, the delegates λ1 = λ2 = λ of course implement the social optimum.
Result 5 (Centralization without delegation) The equilibrium amounts of inputs in cen-
tralization without delegation are the ﬁrst-best amounts (x∗,y∗).
12Cost division is irrelevant in the subgame of cooperative delegates, yet it crucially matters
for the incentives of the non-cooperative citizens who use delegation as a strategic tool.
We will explore the relation between the cost division and strategic delegation in a class of
symmetric linear rules. Unlike Besley and Coate (2003) who examine a special case of the
cost uniformity in the presence of provision non-uniformity, we ﬁnd it natural to extend non-
uniformity also to costs. Speciﬁcally, a linear symmetric rule deﬁnes σ ∈ [0,1] to be a ﬁxed
share of the domestic inputs that is paid by each delegate. To recover all costs, each delegate
and correspondingly also his/her citizen pays 1 − σ share of the foreign inputs,7 hence the
costs write p(σx + (1 − σ)y) in District 1 and p((1 − σ)x + σy) in District 2.
5.1 Centralization and strategic delegation
To consider incentive of Citizen 1 to delegate strategically, Lemma 2 ﬁrst derives how the
structure of inputs provided in cooperative Stage 2 changes with a modiﬁcation of taste of
Delegate 1 in centralization. The change is measured by the eﬀect that the more productive
(foreign) input has upon the less productive (domestic) input. Lemma 2 also compares the
change with a change in the structure of inputs in decentralization with transfers.
Lemma 2 (Strategic complementarity for centralization) Modiﬁcation of taste of Del-





1 + φ + 2ρφ
φ (1 + φ + 2ρ)
> Γ(x,y). (10)
The value ψ(x,y) ∈ (0,1) characterizes the strategic complementarity for any symmetric
proﬁle, not only the equilibrium one. With ρ → +∞ or κ → 0, there is also φ → +∞, and
ψ falls from one to zero. An increase in asymmetry thus weakens strategic complementar-
ity both in the non-cooperative and cooperative regime. Nevertheless, there is a diﬀerence
in the magnitude of the complementarity. In non-cooperative decentralization with cross-
specialization, a unilateral increase in one input leads to an opponent’s increase of the other
input that reﬂects only the opponent’s extra beneﬁts from having more inputs. In coopera-
tive centralization, increases in the amounts of inputs reﬂect extra beneﬁts of both delegates.
Therefore, it is straightforward that strategic complementarity under centralization exceeds
strategic complementarity under decentralization with transfers.
In cooperative centralization, the equilibrium level of strategic delegation critically de-
pends not only upon the magnitude of strategic complementarity, but also upon the division
of the costs. We denote the equilibrium tastes of delegates in the cooperative regime as (ˆ λ, ˆ λ).
Examine incentive of Citizen 1 to deviate by strategic delegation from a symmetric proﬁle
ˆ x = ˆ λ/p, attained by cooperative delegates (ˆ λ, ˆ λ), using again marginal products in (1):
7Notice that the parameter is constant, hence this class of division rules does not account for the case when
possible asymmetry in valuations, λ1  = λ2, modiﬁes the cost share. Nevertheless, the symmetry in the rule
does not necessarily imply symmetry (equality) in costs; if x  = y and σ  =
1
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σψ + 1 − σ
(12)
Lemma 3 exploits (11) to reveal that cooperative centralization with strategic delegation
achieves the ﬁrst-best allocation only if the delegates in the districts (and citizens as their
principals) are required to pay relatively more for the foreign inputs, but are not forced to
completely cross-specialize. In our setup, an ideal cost-division rule in centralization σ∗ also
deviates from the cost-uniformity which is proposed for centralization in the recent literature
(c.f., Harstad 2007).
Lemma 3 (Delegation-proof centralization) If ρ > 0 and κ ∈ (0, 1
2), centralization with






Next, it remains to derive the equilibrium provision as a function of the division rule. Since




λx∗. To present conveniently
the next result, we use (12) as well as σ∗ = 1
1+φ.
Result 6 (Centralization with delegation) The equilibrium amounts of inputs in cen-






σ∗ψ + 1 − σ∗
σψ + 1 − σ
⋚ 1. (13)
This expression combining convex combinations of ψ > 1 and 1 allows us to clearly infer
how the provision responds to a change in the division rule σ. For σ = σ∗, the level is socially
optimal. For σ > σ∗, we have an incentive for high-value delegation and overprovision; in
contrary, if σ < σ∗, we get strategic low-value delegation and underprovision. It is easy
to see that the optimal cost division approaches zero with increasing complementarity or
decreasing spillover; at the limit of perfect complementarity or zero spillover, and the only
distortion associated with centralization can be overprovision, as σ ≥ σ∗ = 0. That the
equilibrium amount increases in the division rule is also intuitive. By nominating a high-
valuation delegate, the cooperation between delegates increases the foreign input more than
the domestic input. For a citizen who is forced to pay more for the domestic input and
less for the foreign input (increasing σ), the eﬀective marginal cost of the incremental local
output decreases and the citizen aims to attain more of the output by means of the strategic
delegation.
145.2 Non-monotonocity in spillovers
In this subsection, we analyze the comparative statics properties in spillovers κ ∈ (0, 1
2).
Since ψ(x,y) is monotonically increasing in spillovers, we may for convenience study how the




σ∗ − σ + (ψ − 1)dσ∗
dψ
(σψ + 1 − σ)2
Clearly, the sign of the marginal eﬀect is determined by the nominator. Let σc be the
cutoﬀ division rule for which the equilibrium level is unchanged, σc := σ∗+(ψ−1)dσ∗
dψ . Since
ψ and σ∗ are independent on the division rule, the cutoﬀ level is also invariant in the division
rule, and changes only with the parameters of the production function, κ and ρ. The cutoﬀ
rule separates the cases when (i) the equilibrium amount is increasing in spillovers (σ < σc),
and when (ii) the amount is decreasing in spillovers (σ > σc). It is relatively straightforward




σ∗ − σc = 0, lim
κ→0
σ∗ − σc =
1
1 + 2ρ
The equilibrium amount follows either of the following patterns: (i) If σ ≥ 1
2, then we
always have σ ≥ 1
2 ≥ σ∗ > σc, hence the equilibrium amount is always decreasing in the
spillovers. (ii) If σ < 1
2, then for κ → 0 where σ∗ → 0, we must have σ > σ∗ ≥ σc, hence we
have overprovision and the amount is decreasing in the spillovers. For κ → 1
2 where σ∗ → 1
2,
we must have σ < σc < σ∗, hence we have underprovision and the amount is increasing
in spillovers. So, if σ < 1
2, the equilibrium amount must be non-monotonic in spillovers,
ﬁrst decreasing from overprovision to underprovision, and then converging back to the social
optimum.
Figure 2 illustrates the marginal eﬀect of an increase in spillovers in space κ×σ for ρ = 1.
For large division rules, σ ≥ 1
2, the provision is always excessive and decreasing, hence it
converges to the eﬃcient amount, and welfare always goes up. For σ < 1
2, we have three
intervals indeed: low spillovers where σ > σ∗, intermediate spillovers where σ ∈ [σc,σ∗],
and high spillovers where σ < σc. Intermediate spillovers are the most interesting; we have
underprovision, but the amount is falling and the wedge between the equilibrium and the
social optimum further grows. In contrast, for large spillovers, the insuﬃcient amount goes
up and converges to the social optimum. Interestingly, monotonicity under cost uniformity
which is observed in Besley and Coate (2003) is for complementarities a knife-edge property
that is invalidated by any, even inﬁnitesimal decrease in the division rule from cost uniformity,
σ = 1
2.
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(a) Changes in the equilibrium levels (b) The equilibrium levels relative to the social optimum
Figure 2: The equilibrium provision in centralization ˆ x
x∗ as a function of spillovers and the
division rule (ρ = 1)
It is also useful to evaluate the equilibrium provision in the extremes of spillovers. For
maximal spillovers, the inputs are symmetric, there is no incentive for manipulation through
strategic delegation, and the amount is eﬃcient irrespective of the division rule. For zero






We now exploit Results 1-6 to generate the welfare comparison of decentralization vs. cen-
tralization. By Oates’ theorem, for taste symmetry, centralization should welfare-dominate
decentralization irrespective of the realizations of spillovers (to be called absolute dominance).
In our setup, feasibility of transfers and strategic delegation are crucial for validity of the abso-
lute dominance. These two options give us four diﬀerent regimes. Performance of centraliza-
tion additionally depends on the division of costs in centralization, hence the full comparison
within each regime is a function of the triple (ρ,κ,σ). Our main interest is how, ceteris
paribus, the tradeoﬀ changes in the level of spillovers.
To start with, Lemma 4 shows that if centralization is tilted towards excessive cross-
specialization and accordingly underprovides, then it underprovides less than decentraliza-
tion. The explanation rests in the diﬀerent levels of strategic complementarity in decentral-
ization and centralization, as observed in Lemma 2. In other words, the true shortcoming
of centralization relative to decentralization can not be underprovision, but only overprovi-
sion associated with excessive focus upon the domestic inputs and insuﬃcient focus upon the
foreign inputs.
16Lemma 4 For σ ≤ σ∗, centralization dominates all decentralization regimes.
For parameters and regimes where centralization does not dominate absolutely (for all
levels of spilllovers), we examine whether it at least dominates for high spillovers, whereas
decentralization dominates for low spillovers (to be called relative dominance). Besley and
Coate (2003) prove relative dominance for pure substitution under cost uniformity (σ = 1
2).
Proposition 1 observes relative dominance for all admissible cost-division rules only in the
regime ‘Transfers, delegation’. In the regime ‘No transfers, delegation’, the division rule is a
key variable for the presence of either absolute or relative dominance. For regimes without
delegation, welfare dominance of centralization is absolute and unconditional on the division
rule.
Proposition 1 (Decentralization tradeoﬀ for imperfectly complementary spillovers) 1.
In the absence of strategic delegation, centralization of complementary spillovers welfare-
dominates decentralization for any κ ∈ (0, 1
2) (absolute dominance).
2. With delegation and without voluntary transfers,
(i) there is a level of the division rule σ > 0, where for all σ < σ, centralization welfare-
dominates decentralization for any κ ∈ (0, 1
2) (absolute dominance conditional on
the low division rule);
(ii) there is a level of the division rule σ < 1, where for all σ > σ, decentraliza-
tion welfare-dominates centralization for low spillovers (κ → 0) and centralization
welfare-dominates decentralization for high spillovers (κ → 1
2) (relative dominance
conditional on the high division rule).
3. With delegation and voluntary transfers, there is a cutoﬀ level 0 ≤ K < 1
2 such that
decentralization dominates centralization for κ < K, centralization dominates decentral-
ization for κ > K, and provisions are identical for κ = K (relative dominance).
For convenient exposition, Table 1 evaluates the equilibrium levels of inputs for the ex-
treme values of spillovers. The tradeoﬀs at these extremes are easily obtained, recalling
ρ > 0 and σ ∈ [0,1]. In the mid part of Table 1, the provisions are expressed in the closed
form for the intermediate values of spillovers. The welfare comparisons corresponding to the
intermediate levels refer to Proposition 1.
Table 1: The equilibrium amounts of inputs relative to social
optimum and welfare comparison of centralization vs. decen-
tralization
κ → 0 Decentralization Centralization Tradeoﬀ
17Table 1: The equilibrium amounts of inputs relative to social
optimum and welfare comparison of centralization vs. decen-
tralization
No transfers No delegation 0 1 C
No transfers Delegation
ρ
1+ρ ∈ (0,1) 1
1−σ ∈ (1,+∞) C or D
Transfers No delegation 1 1 identical
Transfers Delegation 1 1
1−σ ∈ (1,+∞) D
κ ∈ (0, 1
2)
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To sum up, Oates’ prediction of absolute dominance for taste symmetry is conditional on
other features in the economy and politics. With strategic delegation, centralization under
taste-symmetry is no longer wasteless. Like in Besley and Coate (2003), cooperative central-
ization distorts cooperative centralization as citizens tend to manipulate identities of their
delegates to achieve marginal subsidies. We add that the distortion may be both into overpro-
vision and underprovision, but only overprovision may invalidate Oates’ prediction. Secondly,
strategic delegation is not only detrimental to welfare; it boosts the level in decentralization
as the citizens get an extra instrument to exploit strategic complementarity between the
inputs and thereby internalize spillovers. Notice also that the strategic complementarity is
unrelated to income eﬀects of opponent’s contributions and stems purely from the technical
complementarity in the output functions.
Consequently, it is not surprising that a necessary condition for welfare-dominance of
decentralization is strategic delegation that is largely distortive in centralization (see Corollary
1) and at the same time welfare-improving in decentralization. Speciﬁcally, the distortion
in centralization abounds for large division rules and low spillovers, and the distortion in
decentralization in the presence of transfers is small for low spillovers.
Corollary 1 A necessary condition for welfare-dominance of decentralization is strategic del-
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(a) Decentralization (b) Centralization with delegation




x∗) for ρ = 1
To shed even more light on the tradeoﬀ in spillovers, Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium
levels of inputs9 evaluated for a particular value of complementarity, ρ = 1. Panel (a) plots
the levels under the four decentralized regimes, while Panel (b) plots the centralized levels in
regimes in the presence of delegation and for the selected levels of the division rule.
6 Conclusions
This paper asks whether complementary aggregation of domestic spending and foreign spill-
in in a symmetric two-district setting aﬀects properties of the decentralization tradeoﬀ as
described by the seminal decentralization theorem (Oates 1972, 2005). We cover a complete
class of complementary aggregations with a constant elasticity of substitution. We observe
that high complementarity of a lower level of spillovers increase productivity of spending in
the foreign district relative to domestic spending, which motivates specialization across the
9We use that for symmetric allocations, welfare strictly increases in the amounts of inputs if x < x
∗
and strictly decreases in the amounts of inputs if x > x
∗. When examining welfare in regimes that feature
underprovision, we may therefore interchangeably use the levels of inputs. To compare overprovision with un-
derprovision, we need to introduce welfare-equivalent input levels that correspond to underprovision. Namely,
if x > x
∗, we map the original variable x into a welfare-equivalent h(x), where λlnh(x) − ph(x) = λlnx − px
and h(x) < x
∗. (Or, we replace x/x
∗ by h(x)/x
∗ because in the forthcoming analysis, every provision is













19districts. This contrasts the standard case of substitutes, wherein a decrease in the level
of spillovers makes a foreign spill-in relatively less important. We also demonstrate that an
increase in spillovers is strategically equivalent to an increase in complementarity.
Like Besley and Coate (2003), we explicitly compare the decentralized equilibrium with
cooperative centralization and control for the strategic delegation. Unlike Besley and Coate
(2003), we investigate a complete class of linear cost-division rules instead of a special case
of the uniform cost division. We examine four regimes that vary in the presence and ab-
sence of strategic delegation and voluntary transfers. A general message is that centralization
dominates decentralization in most regimes under vast ranges of parameters. This echoes
Oates’ statement that in symmetric setting with positive spillovers, centralization is prefer-
able. Importantly, we obtain that if centralization underprovides, it is still the second-best
regime.
Nevertheless, we can also identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for decentralization
to welfare-dominate centralization. A key necessary condition is the presence of strategic
delegation. Strategic delegation, combined with a division rule that is excessively oriented
to payments for domestic inputs, distorts centralization to overprovision. The distortion is
large with small spillovers. In contrast, underprovision in decentralization is partly remedied
with strategic delegation and transfers. Therefore, with strategic delegation and transfers,
decentralization always welfare-dominates centralization for low spillovers if centralization
largely overprovides, namely if the division rule in centralization is tilted toward excessive
payment for the less productive domestic input.
The decentralization tradeoﬀ additionally reﬂects two structurally new phenomena. First,
contrary to intuition, welfare in decentralization may grow if spillovers increase. This is asso-
ciated with the absence of transfers. Second, welfare in centralization may be non-monotonic
in spillovers. This is associated with strategic delegation and the fact that the optimal di-
vision rule is endogenous to spillovers. These two novel eﬀects are combined in the regime
‘No transfers, delegation’, and lead to ambiguity of the general welfare comparison in this
regime. In the other regimes, centralization either dominates absolutely (i.e., for any level of
spillovers) or relatively (i.e., only for large spillovers).
This setup also incorporates the level of complementarity into the optimal design of cen-
tralization. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-best allocation can be implemented in centralization through
a delegation-proof cost-sharing rule, yet the rule varies in the economy fundamentals. The
less elastic output and the larger spillover, the less of the domestic input should be paid by
each district. Thereby, we contribute to the literature on the pros and cons of the uniformity
requirement in the interjurisdictional bargaining (c.f. Harstad 2007).
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A The production functions
First, see that in any in symmetric proﬁle, x = y, the marginal rates of technical transforma-















i (gi) be conditional demands for inputs x and y, i.e. the cost-
minimizing input-mix along an isoquant gi = g. Irrespective of the isoquant, the ratio of

























1 > 1 > xd
2/yd
2. Each citizen thus cares relatively more for the domestic input. In
contrast, for complementarity (ρ > 0), we have φ > 1, while elasticity of substitution is still
positive 1
1+ρ ∈ (0,1), hence the conditional demands feature xd
1/yd







2. Each district cares relatively more for the foreign input.
The asymmetric interest in inputs increases in complementarity,
∂φ
∂ρ = φlog 1−κ
κ > 0. It










∂κ > 0, while under complementarity,
∂φ
∂κ < 0. We know that
inputs are more symmetric if φ → 1. For substitutability, this happens if φ increases, which
is by having either a larger spillover (dκ > 0) or weaker substitutability (dρ > 0). For
complementarity, inputs become more symmetrically productive if φ decreases, which is by
having either a larger spillover (dκ > 0) or weaker complementarity (dρ < 0). To sum
up, the eﬀect of increasing spillovers upon input asymmetry is identical for substitutes and
complements, but the eﬀect of the increasing elasticity of substitution upon input asymmetry
varies between substitutes and complements.
22To shed more light on the eﬀects of increasing spillovers, examine further the optimal pro-
duction mix. In complementarity, we must take into account not only a standard substitution
mechanism, but also the low elasticity of substitution between the inputs. We decompose the
eﬀects in the following way: Let X := (1−κ)x and Y := κy be the eﬀective amounts of inputs







; speciﬁcally, for conditional demands, let
Xd := (1−κ)xd and Y d := (1−κ)yd. An increase in spillover dκ > 0 is equivalent to a change
in the relative prices of the eﬀective inputs such that the domestic eﬀective input becomes
more expensive and the foreign eﬀective input cheaper. With an increase in the relative price
of the X-input, a standard technical substitution implies that for eﬀective amounts in the
optimal production mix, dXd
Y d < 0. In addition to this eﬀect, the overall eﬀect upon nominal
amounts consist also from the change in the transformation rate from the eﬀective amount
to nominal amount. A larger spillover makes transformation of domestic eﬀective input into
domestic nominal input stronger as xd
1 = Xd
1−κ and transformation of foreign eﬀective input
into nominal input weaker as yd
1 = Y d
κ . The eﬀect on transformation rate goes in the opposite
direction to the technical substitution eﬀect present for eﬀective amounts. In total, we have















Since elasticity of substitution is positive, 1
1+ρ > 0, the sign is negative for substitutability,
where
∂φ
∂κ > 0, and positive for complementarity, where
∂φ
∂κ > 0. This also corresponds to the
fact that the elasticity of substitution is large for substitutes, 1
1+ρ ≥ 1, but small for comple-
ments, 1
1+ρ ∈ (0,1). Under substitutability, to make an eﬀective input more expensive implies
a sharp decrease in the amount of the eﬀective input, hence a strong technical substitution
eﬀect. Under complementarity, the amount of the eﬀective input drops, but given comple-
mentarities between the eﬀective inputs, not signiﬁcantly. The weak technical substitution
eﬀect is overridden by the eﬀect upon transformation rates. This results in an increase in the
nominal amount. Somewhat paradoxically, with an increase in spill-in and decrease of the
eﬀective amount of the domestic input, the nominal foreign input is eﬀectively less important
for the production, consequently demanded at lower amounts. And vice versa, the nominal
domestic input is eﬀectively more important for the production. The intuition is that for
complementarity, making one complementary input relatively less accessible means that it
must be demanded at higher levels to compensate for its insuﬃciency.
B Stability of T-proﬁle to F-proﬁle
To identify free-riding F-proﬁles (labeled F in Fig. 1), let Delegate 1 be the free rider and
Delegate 2 the provider. The exact characterization of the free-riding F-allocation is at an
intersection of the provider’s (Delegate 2’s) single-input optima, xF = xC











































An incentive to deviate from T-proﬁle associated with (˜ λ, ˜ λ) to F-proﬁle associated with
(λ1, ˜ λ) is weak enough if
λln ˜ g1 − p˜ y ≥ λlngF
1 . (14)
This property largely depends on the logarithmic shape of the utility function. Gener-
ally, notice that T-proﬁle’s disadvantage stems from the fact that inframarginal contributions
have to be paid. A simple way to relax this disadvantage while keeping all marginal decisions
unaﬀected is to modify the beneﬁt function, for example into ln(gi + b). If we substitute
Gi = gi + b, then b ≥ 0 is to be interpreted as the baseline level of output that is provided
exogenously. Marginal decisions over the additional amount gi are equivalent to the marginal
decisions over the total output Gi, only substitution applies. Thereby, free-riding associated
with F-proﬁle becomes less attractive since cost-saving relative to T-proﬁle is lower. A similar
way is to assume that some inputs are provided exogenously. Upon request, we can demon-
strate that a deviation to F-proﬁle in the case of baseline levels set to (xb,yb) occurs only in an
interval around κ = 0.4. Notice that these baseline levels are the lowest interior equilibrium
provisions in all decentralized regimes, hence introduction of maximally these levels implies
extra constraints (x ≥ xb,y ≥ yb) that however are not binding in an equilibrium.
C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, consider Citizen 1. We can eliminate
deviations to A-proﬁles in three steps. First, let H-proﬁle (xH,yH) = (xC
1 (yH),yC
1 (xH)) be
the proﬁle constructed from the single-input optima of Citizen 1. In other words, (xH,yH)
are the amounts of total inputs that Citizen 1 wants to spend if he/she expects that nothing
is provided by the other district; H-proﬁle is the best out of all proﬁles where Citizen 1 bears
full costs. Since in A-proﬁles, Citizen 1 pays all costs, H-proﬁle (at least weakly) dominates
all A-proﬁles.
Second, any A-proﬁle is deﬁned by the single-input optima of Delegate 1 with taste λ1 ≥
λ1 > ˜ λ > λ. The Delegate 1 who implements A-proﬁle is therefore a high-valuation delegate,
24who implements (xA,yA), where xA > xH and yA > yH. Therefore, for Citizen 1, all A-
proﬁles overprovide, and the best out of A-proﬁles is the minimal one. It is associated with
λ1 = λ1. We can proceed with this proﬁle only.
Third, if Citizen 1 delegates λ1 = λ1 −ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is very small, he/she must be better
oﬀ because the level of the output g1 changes very little (continuous loss), whereas Delegate
2 starts to participate by covering fully input x, and this implies a discrete gain for Citizen 1.
Hence, even the best out of A-proﬁles is worse for Citizen 1 than a T-proﬁle associated with
(λ1 − ǫ, ˜ λ), and consequently also worse than a T-proﬁle associated with (˜ λ, ˜ λ). 2
Proof of Lemma 2. To start with, we implicitly characterize the amounts of inputs that



























For any modiﬁcation of taste of Delegate 1 from the baseline level λ1 = λ, i.e. for λ1 =
λ + dλ1, the cooperative centralization must deliver Wx(λ + dλ1,λ,x + dx,y + dy) = 0 and
Wy(λ + dλ1,λ,x + dx,y + dy) = 0. Using subscripts for partial derivatives of the implicit









y dy = 0.























































































25Imposing into the equations describing the change in inputs, we derive how the structure


































y , we express a general form
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We plug all partial derivatives into (15) to obtain the level of strategic complementarity
in (10). As a ﬁnal step, we compare (9) and (10) for ρ > 0 and by rearranging obtain
Γ(x,y) =
ρ
1 + φ + ρ
<
1
φ + 1 + 2ρ
φ + 1 + 2ρ
=
1 + φ + 2φρ
φ2 + φ + 2φρ
= ψ(x,y). 2









(1 − ψ) (16)
For imperfect complementarity and κ ∈ (0, 1
2), recall that by (10), ψ(x,y) ∈ (0,1). There-
fore, (16) equals zero (i.e., sincere delegation ˆ λ = λ is stable to unilateral strategic delegation)
if and only if the term in the large brackets is zero. For other cost-division rules, σ  = 1
1+φ,
the symmetric equilibrium features ˆ λ  = λ, hence ˆ x =
ˆ λ
p  = λ
p = x∗. 2
Proof of Lemma 4. Without delegation, centralization is ﬁrst-best. With delegation,
the best decentralized outcome out of the four regimes is for transfers and delegation, ˜ x =
max{xb, ¯ x,xt, ˜ x}. The outcome of the centralized regime is ˆ x. The equilibrium in the decen-


















26For centralization, start with σ = 0. Using ψ(x,y) > Γ(x,y), we express the marginal
utility of manipulating the input structure at the level corresponding to decentralization,
x = ˜ x, as follows:
du1
dy
   


















(ψ(x,y) − Γ(x,y)) > 0
The ﬁrst-order condition in centralization is satisﬁed only if there are more x-inputs, hence
we have ˆ x > ˜ x. Now, since since ˆ x is increasing in σ, and an increase in x up to σ∗ must
represent additional increase in the inputs and a welfare improvement. Therefore, for any
σ ∈ [0,σ∗], centralization welfare-dominates decentralization. 2
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove each part separately.
1. By Result 5, centralization without delegation is social eﬃcient, whereas by Results 1
and 3, decentralization with or without transfers is ineﬃcient for κ ∈ (0, 1
2).
2. We always use that the provisions and also welfare diﬀerences are continuous in the
division rule and spillovers.
(i) Low division rules: For σ = 0, we have by Lemma 4 that ˆ x > x′, hence the welfare-
diﬀerence between centralization and decentralization is positive irrespective of the
level of spillovers. Thus, there is a non-empty neighborhood of σ = 0 where the
diﬀerence is positive for κ ∈ (0,1/2).
(ii) High division rules: We examine the welfare diﬀerence in the extreme; once we
observe a positive (negative) welfare diﬀerence between decentralization and cen-
tralization, we use that the diﬀerence must be positive (negative) also for ad-
missible values in the neighborhood of the extreme. In speciﬁc, in the extreme
(σ,κ) = (1,1/2), we have in decentralization limκ→1/2 x′ =
1+ρ
2+ρ < 1 and in cen-
tralization limκ→1/2 ˆ x = 1. Thus, for admissible elements in the neighborhood of
(σ,κ) = (1,1/2), centralization welfare-dominates decentralization. Similarly, in
the extreme (σ,κ) = (1,0), we have in decentralization limκ→0 x′ =
ρ
1+ρ > 0 and in
centralization limκ→0 ˆ x = ∞, hence its welfare-equivalent satisﬁes limκ→0 h(ˆ x) →
0. Thus, for admissible elements in the neighborhood of (κ,σ) = (1/2,1), decen-
tralization welfare-dominates centralization.
3. First, notice that the provision in decentralization relative to the social optimum (and
also welfare in decentralization) decreases from 1 to
1+ρ
2+ρ < 1. In centralization, we know
that provision is ﬁrst (i) excessive but decreasing, then (ii) insuﬃcient and decreasing,
and ﬁnally (iii) insuﬃcient and increasing. This means that welfare in centralization
(i) grows, (ii) falls and again (iii) grows. By Lemma 4, on Intervals (ii) and (iii),
we have σ < σ∗ and therefore centralization dominates decentralization. On Interval
27(i), welfare in decentralization is decreasing, and welfare in centralization is increasing.
Now, for the lowest spillover that satisﬁes Interval (i), i.e. κ = 0, decentralized amount
is eﬃcient and weakly-welfare-dominates the centralized amount, and for the highest
spillover that satisﬁes Interval (ii), i.e. σ∗ = σ, centralization weakly-welfare-dominates
decentralization, there must be a cutoﬀ level K on Interval (i) where the welfare is
identical. 2
Proof of Corollary 1. Let A is proposition that centralization welfare-dominates decen-
tralization, B is proposition that σ ≤ σ∗, and C is proposition that strategic delegation is
not allowed. By Lemma 4, B ⇒ A. By Part (i) of Proposition 1, C ⇒ A. Therefore,
¬A ⇒ (¬B ∧ ¬C). 2
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